CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 15
PROLOGUE 17
INTRODUCTION 27
PART ONE
ELEMENTS OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
CHAPTER 1
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION OF DELIBERATION BY MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC FORCES IN COLOMBIA 35
1.1 Historiographical Analysis 39
1.1.1. Origin: Independence between Politics and Armed Forces 39
1.1.2. Institutional Development 44
1.1.3. Problematic Equation: Consequence of the Prohibition of Deliberation by the Public Forces 52
1.1.4. The 1991 Political Constitution: Ambiguity 61
1.2. Intervention of the Judiciary 80
1.2.1. Judgment C-578/95: Instrumentalization in Favor of Democracy 81
1.2.2. Judgment C-25/12002: Supremacy of Civilian Power 81
1.2.3. Judgment C-43/12004: Constitutional Censure 84
1.2.4. Judgments C-794/r4 and C-379/r6: Definitive Exclusion from the Political Community 89
1.3. Institutional Election on Two Levels 97
1.3.1. Cooperative Vision 97
1.3.2. Distributive Vision 104
1.3.3. A Possible Explanation: The Simile of the Triangles 118
1.4. Conclusions of Chapter 124
CHAPTER 2
THE DIALOGICAL PARADIGM OF DEMOCRACY AND THE PROFESSION AS A CATEGORY OF POLITICAL EXCLUSION 131
2.1. Deliberative Democracy as a Regulatory Ideal 135
2.2. The Public Sphere 149
2.3. Who? The Subjects of Deliberation 155
2.4. The Principles of All Those Affected, All Subjects, and the Condition of the Common World 162
2.5. The Profession as a Category of Political Exclusion 174
2.6. Conclusions of Chapter 176
CHAPTER 3
THE DIALOGICAL PARADIGM IN THE 1991 POLITICAL CONSTITUTION 181
3.1. Budgets 185
3.1.1. Colombia: A Democratic System 186
3.1.2. Convergence of Orientations 186
3.1.3. Preexistence of the Deliberative Doctrine 192
3.2. Elements of Deliberative Democracy in Colombian Constitutionalism 193
3.2.1. Legitimacy of the Constitution 193
3.2.2. Catalog of Rights 200
3.2.3. Structural Principles and Preconditions 204
3.2.4. Deliberative Commitment in the Legislative Process 214
3.2.5. Institutional Mechanisms for Deliberative Democratic Participation 220
3.2.6. Public Sphere 224
3.2.7. Deliberative Commitment in the Design of Constitutional Justice 225
3.3. Imposed Deliberative Democracy? 229
3.4. Conclusions of Chapter 240
PART TWO
THEORETICAL PROPOSAL
CHAPTER 4
DELIBERATION: AN URGENCY-BASED MORAL CLAIM 247
4.1. Preliminary Question: Deliberation as a Human Right 252
4.2. Intrinsic Arguments 258
4.2.1. The Principle of Public Equality 258
4.2.2. The Principle of Liberty 267
4.3. Instrumental Arguments 275
4.3.1. The Effectiveness of the All-Affected Principle 275
4.3.2. The Realization of the Epistemic Value of Democracy 278
4.4. Equal Opportunity: The Outcome of the Moral Right to Deliberate 285
4.5. Counterarguments: Deliberation Is Not a Moral Right 296
4.5.1. Democracy as a Market: Why Deliberate if Voting Exists 297
4.5.2. Agonistic Democracy: There Is Nothing to Deliberate About 301
4.6. Conclusions from the Chapter 308
CHAPTER 5
DELIBERATION AS A RIGHT 315
5.1. The Moral Right to Deliberate 319
5.1.1. Nature 321
5.1.2. Distinctive Characteristics 322
Abogado, profesional en Ciencias Militares, especialista en Derecho Administrativo, especialista en Seguridad y Defensa Nacionales, magíster en Derecho Público, doctor en Derecho con calificación de tesis meritoria sobre “El derecho fundamental a deliberar de los miembros de la Fuerza Pública en Colombia”. Sus principales líneas de investigación son el derecho internacional humanitario, los derechos humanos, la teoría jurídica, la seguridad y defensa, y los derechos fundamentales de los miembros de la Fuerza Pública.