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CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION 9
2. LUHMANN'S POINT OF DEPARTURE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 11
2.1. Contingency and Complexity 11
2.2. Selection of Possibilities and Meaning 12
2.2.1. Structuring of Expectations 13
2.2.2. Double Contingency 13
2.2.3. Need to Reduce Complexity 16
2.3. Generalizations as Mechanisms of the Social System 17
2.3.1. Temporal Generalization 17
2.3.1.1. Normative Expectations and Cognitive Expectations 18
2.3.1.2. Deception 20
2.3.2. Social Generalization 22
2.3.2.1. The Expectant Third Party and the Observer 22
2.3.2.2. Presumed Consensus 23
2.3.2.3. Institution and Third Party 24
2.3.3. Material Generalization 26
2.3.3.1. Abstraction 27
2.3.3.2. People, Roles, Programs, and Values 28
2.4. Law as a Congruent Generalization 31
3. TRANSITION FROM THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW TO THE LAW OF SOCIETY 33
3.1. Starting Point: System-Environment Difference 33
3.2. From Structures to Operations 35
3.3. Self-Reference and Heteroreference 36
3.4. Autopoietic Closure and Cognitive Openness 38
3.4.1. Structural Couplings 40
3.4.2. Unity of the System 41
3.4.3. Heterarchy as a Form of Organization 43
3.5. Autonomy of Law 45
3.5.1. Binary Code 46
3.5.2. Function of Law 49
3.5.2.1. Functionally Differentiated Society 50
3.5.2.2. Counterfactual Stabilization of Expectations 52
3.5.2.3. Benefits of Law 55
3.5.2.4. Function and Binary Code 57
3.6. Relationship between Law and Physical Force 58
3.6.1. Physical Force as Communication 58
3.6.2. Is Physical Force Part of Law? 59
4. CONCLUSION 63
REFERENCES 65
